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Customizing Employment Arbitration
Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas†
ABSTRACT: According to the dispute resolution literature, one advantage
of arbitration over litigation is that arbitration enables the parties to
customize their dispute-resolution procedures. For example, parties can
choose the qualifications of the arbitrator(s), the governing procedural rules,
the limitation period, recoverable damages, rules for discovery and the
presentation of evidence and witnesses, and the specificity of required
arbitrator findings. While some scholars have questioned whether parties to
arbitration agreements frequently take advantage of this customization,
there is little solid empirical information about the topic.
In this Article, we study the arbitration clauses found in a random
sample of 910 Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) employment contracts
entered into during the time period from 1995 to 2005 to determine how
much customization actually takes place. We find only a small number of
instances where fine-grained customization has occurred. Parties pay very
little attention to customizing arbitral proceedings in these employment
contracts although there is a significant increase in the practice over time.
We find this result surprising given that CEO contracts are heavily
negotiated documents.
Unexpectedly, we find that about half of the arbitration clauses in our
contracts carve out a subset of potential claims or types of relief by reserving
a right for the parties to seek such relief or file such claims in court. This
phenomenon of customizing the circumstances under which parties will use
arbitration has received almost no attention in the academic literature to
date. In particular, we find that the types of claims carved out for court
resolution are those involving a firm’s efforts to protect the value of its
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information, reputation, and innovation. CEOs and companies in the
information technology business are not significantly more likely to carve out
such claims, and the use of these carveouts is increasing over time,
suggesting that such carveouts are increasingly valuable to all firms.
Unfortunately, California court regulation of arbitration clauses in
employment contracts has significantly dampened the use of carveouts in
contracts between CEOs and their firms located in California. Our data
suggest that court efforts to protect employees by scrutinizing the specific
carveouts we observe is both unnecessary and destructive.
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INTRODUCTION

Arbitration has become an increasingly popular form of dispute
resolution. Today, it is routine for businesses, consumers, and employees to
resort to arbitration rather than courts when they seek redress.1 This trend
has been particularly pronounced in the United States, where the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)2 to contain a very
strong pro-arbitration policy.3 Parties can agree to arbitrate virtually any
claim, including claims arising under the federal securities acts, patent law,
antitrust, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), and employment discrimination and other civil rights acts.4
According to Supreme Court precedent, the broad respect for agreements
to arbitrate applies both when they are negotiated between the parties and
when they appear in contracts of adhesion, including consumer5 and
employment contracts.6 Arbitration clauses are even upheld where the clear
purpose of arbitration is to circumvent procedural mechanisms like class
actions, designed to ensure that such claims will be brought in the first
place.7 With relatively limited exception, the Court has uniformly struck
down state regulations that interfere with arbitration under the FAA.8
Arbitration is thought to be popular for many reasons, including that it
can be customized to suit the desires of the parties.9 Scholars have noted
that parties often use arbitration clauses to select a specific arbitration
association, a particular location for the proceedings, and an off-the-rack set
of governing rules.10 In addition, parties can specify the number of
arbitrators who will decide their case(s),11 qualifications of their
1. See infra Part II.B.
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra notes 78–87 and accompanying text.
5. The Supreme Court has been particularly active this term in ensuring the
enforcement of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr.,
Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam) (nursing home care agreements);
Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) (consumer credit card contracts).
6. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (employment
discrimination claims).
7. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that
California law prohibiting many class waiver clauses in arbitration agreements was preempted
by the FAA).
8. See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
9. See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 444 (2011) (noting
that federal arbitration law provides parties with an arbitral option that they can fill with
customized procedures).
10. See, e.g., 1 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 619 (2009)
(describing the material terms of an arbitration agreement as “number of, identity of and
means of selecting arbitrators, arbitral seat, scope of agreement, institutional rules, [and]
choice of law”).
11. Id.
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arbitrator(s),12 and the governing procedures for choosing the decision
maker(s).13 The parties can further specify the mode and conduct of arbitral
proceedings, including the relevant rules of discovery14 and of evidence.15
Furthermore, the parties can state whether they wish the arbitrator’s
findings to contain the arbitrator’s reasoning,16 and they can choose a
purely private form of law to guide the substantive outcome.17
While the possibilities for customization seem limitless,18 there has been
little work on understanding whether the parties actually do customize their
arbitration clauses in this manner.19 What types of customization are
common for arbitration agreements, and what types are more likely the
products of creative but fanciful thinking by law professors?20
In this Article, we explore these questions using a hand-coded,
randomly selected sample of 910 CEO employment contracts at S&P 1500
public companies. CEO employment contracts are particularly useful for our

12. Frederick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving
Transnational Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the People’s Republic of China, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
329, 334 (1997).
13. BORN, supra note 10, at 176–77.
14. Anthony J. Diana et al., Electronic Discovery in Specific Areas of Practice, in ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY DESKBOOK 2012, at 299, 234 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser.
No. 35302, 2012).
15. 1999 IBA Working Party & 2010 IBA Rules of Evidence Review Subcomm., Commentary
on the Revised Text of the 2010 IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, 5 DISP.
RESOL. INT’L 45, 46 (2011).
16. Alan Scott Rau, On Integrity in Private Judging, 14 ARB. INT’L 115, 146–50 (1998).
17. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (explaining how cotton
industry uses arbitration where privately drafted contract rules are applied).
18. They are not actually limitless. For example, parties to arbitration agreements
governed by the FAA may not contract to alter the applicable standard of review of arbitral
awards, at least not in federal courts. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576
(2008).
19. Existent empirical evidence includes one study of fifty-two arbitration clauses found in
a wide variety of consumer contracts, Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” To
Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 55, and one study of twenty standard-form franchise
agreements, Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L.
REV. 1103 (2011) (presenting results of former study that indicated an increasing trend toward
the use of several customized terms in franchise agreements). In addition, there is at least one
study of the use of class waivers in consumer contracts. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s
Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008).
20. In some law review articles, the author counsels businesses to pay more attention to
their customization options, which suggests a belief that customization is at least suboptimally
infrequent. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New
Litigation,” 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383 (2009); Eileen B. Vernon, Arbitration in the
Energy/Minerals Field: Customizing the Clause, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 50 (2001) (advocating updated
customization of arbitration clauses used by environmental, energy, and natural-resource
companies).

2012]

CUSTOMIZING EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION

137

inquiry because they are heavily negotiated documents entered into by
sophisticated parties. Consistent with our earlier research, we find that the
use of arbitration provisions is increasing over time, but that beyond a few
basic decisions about which arbitration associations to use, whether to
employ those associations’ arbitration rules, and to a much lesser extent,
how to divide the costs of the proceeding, these parties and their attorneys
rarely focus on customizing arbitration provisions. In other words, despite
the robust academic literature on the subject, real-world customization is
largely absent, although we find some evidence that it is slowly increasing
over time.
We are surprised to find strong evidence of a very different form of
customization: carving out certain types of litigable claims from otherwise
broad agreements to arbitrate. These litigation carveouts have received scant
attention in the arbitration literature.21 In fact, most of the arbitration
literature assumes that parties face a binary choice between courts and
arbitration for the resolution of all of their disputes. But in the context of
CEO employment agreements, we find it is commonplace for the parties to
draft provisions generally requiring arbitration but at the same time
reserving a right for the parties to go to court under some defined
circumstances. Effectively, these parties are customizing the border between
courts and arbitration for specific types of claims. We believe that the
carveouts studied in this paper might be common in other types of contracts
as well,22 making them an important topic for future research.
More broadly, our study of CEO employment contracts provides a
unique opportunity to revisit arguments about some common practices
related to arbitration between employers and employees. Employment
arbitration is controversial in the United States.23 Although employment
21. To our knowledge, only Christopher Drahozal has empirically studied carveouts from
arbitration, and carveouts typically play only a very minor role in his studies. See, e.g.,
Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695 [hereinafter
Drahozal, Unfair Arbitration Clauses]; Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a
Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71 (2008). Drahozal and Stephen Ware have both
addressed the topic of carveouts in nonempirical articles. Christopher R. Drahozal, Nonmutual
Agreements To Arbitrate, 27 J. CORP. L. 537, 552–55 (2002); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of
Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 98–100.
22. See Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Carveouts and the Choice Between Courts and Arbitration
(draft manuscript on file with authors) (studying carveouts in different types of contracts and
involving parties from different countries to discern circumstances under which parties
affirmatively demand courts).
23. Christopher R. Drahozal, Busting Arbitration Myths, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 663, 665 (2008);
Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-compete Covenants
as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 379 (2006); Jyotin Hamid & Emily J.
Mathieu, The Arbitration Fairness Act: Performing Surgery with a Hatchet Instead of a Scalpel?, 74 ALB.
L. REV. 769, 769 (2011); Keith N. Hylton, Agreements To Waive or To Arbitrate Legal Claims: An
Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 248 (2000); David S. Ruder, Securities Arbitration in
the Public Interest: The Role of Punitive Damages, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 69, 72 n.23 (1997); Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding
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arbitration promises a quicker, cheaper, and less adversary means for
employees to resolve their disputes with employers, critics charge that the
arbitration agreements are contracts of adhesion, that the employment
arbitration system is rigged in favor of employers, and that employers utilize
arbitration to effectively deprive employees of their rights.24
Given the concerns about the fairness of employment arbitration,
governments and arbitration associations have responded in several
different ways.25 Particularly relevant to this Article, many U.S. state courts
use the contract law doctrine of unconscionability to scrutinize the terms of
arbitration clauses in employment contracts for fundamental fairness. In the
context of arbitration carveouts, a number of U.S. courts will strike an
arbitration clause as unconscionable if it forces only the employee to
arbitrate her claims, while still preserving the employer’s right to enforce its
rights in court.26 In California, state courts have struck down arbitration
clauses that on their face require both parties to bring their claims to
arbitration but then carve out from arbitration claims that are likely to be
brought by the employer.27 Given that California is often a leader in state
efforts to regulate unfair arbitration provisions, its stance on this issue could
well spread to other states.
Our CEO employment contracts provide a window into the terms of
employment agreements where both parties have significant bargaining
power and actively negotiate their agreements with the assistance of
counsel.28 These agreements are admittedly very different from the adhesion
contracts typically found in employment, but the very fact that our contracts
are negotiated can provide some indication of whether sophisticated
employees think arbitration disserves their interests. In our contracts, the
terms that survive mutual negotiation likely are not the product of employer
overreaching, but rather reflect the strong economic desire of one of the
parties to obtain a legal right, even if it means that the party must provide
extra compensation, or alternate concessions, in order to obtain the right.
This suggests that if we find that the parties commonly agree to certain
arbitration provisions, these provisions must be the result of an efficient

Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 670 (1996); Adriaan Lanni, Case Note, Protecting Public Rights
in Private Arbitration, 107 YALE L.J. 1157, 1161 n.25 (1998).
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. See infra Part II.C.
26. See infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 134–37 and accompanying text. As we discuss below, when courts find
unconscionable the types of carveouts observed in our contracts, the arbitration clause is struck
in its entirety and employers find themselves unable to rely on arbitration for the resolution of
any claims.
28. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 236–39 (2006)
(describing prevalent contracting behavior among CEOs and their firms’ boards).
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bargain between them.29 Such findings may have implications for the
enforceability of similar provisions in other employment contracts; if even
sophisticated employees are comfortable accepting these terms, then
perhaps courts should reconsider their hostility to such contract clauses.
Along these lines, our first important finding is that about half of the CEO
employment agreements provide for the arbitration of disputes, and that the
use of arbitration clauses is increasing significantly over time. Our finding
suggests that the use of arbitration in the context of employment provides
significant perceived legitimate benefit to one or both parties, at least for
sophisticated parties.
Our second finding relevant to state regulation of arbitration clauses is
that almost half of the contracts with arbitration clauses carve out the very
types of disputes that would cause the California courts to strike
employment arbitration clauses. These carveouts include disputes pertaining
to the confidentiality, noncompete, nonsolicitation, and nondisparagement
clauses of the employment agreement. Collectively, these clauses appear to
be designed to enable the firm to protect the value of its information,
reputation, and innovation. Although we believe that employment
arbitration provisions probably should be scrutinized by courts to ensure
their fundamental fairness, it appears that these carveouts serve a legitimate
economic function for the company and do not simply represent
overreaching in a one-sided contract of adhesion. Court scrutiny of these
carveouts in employment contracts, especially CEO and top management
contracts, therefore seems misplaced.
Our study also provides evidence that the California court decisions
have significantly influenced the drafting of arbitration agreements by firms
primarily located in California. Using multivariate regression analysis, we
find that California firms were significantly more likely than non-California
firms to contract for preliminary relief in courts (a carveout permitted by
California courts), but significantly less likely to carve out other, more
nuanced, claims for resolution by courts (carveouts considered suspect in
California courts). For many non-California firms, court resolution of the
latter types of claims, such as those involving restrictions on disclosing
confidential firm information or soliciting key employees, appears to enable
firms to better protect themselves and their shareholders. Those benefits are
denied to firms primarily located in California. In the end, California
doctrine provides no additional legitimate benefit to employees while
inflicting harm on local firms.
We proceed as follows. Part II frames our research questions and
provides a review of the existing academic literature and governing law on

29. Specifically, the bargain must be Kaldor-Hicks efficient in that one of the parties is
willing to negotiate away other possible advantages in order to include the carveout in the
agreement.
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arbitration agreements and their contents. In Part III we describe our CEO
employment contracts sample and provide a univariate analysis of its
contents. Part IV provides a multivariate analysis of the determinants of the
use of arbitration provisions, customization, and carveouts. Part V discusses
the implications of our study for court treatment of arbitration carveouts
and for future scholarship.
II. A BRIEF ARBITRATION PRIMER
To set the stage for our research questions, in Subpart A we briefly
describe the growth of arbitration and common factors that can lead
contracting parties to opt for arbitration of disputes. Subpart B then
discusses the current state of arbitration law as it relates to court regulation
of parties’ agreements to arbitrate, and it addresses the application of the
unconscionability doctrine to arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion.
Subpart C concludes by describing special court concerns regarding
employment arbitration.
A. CHOOSING TO ARBITRATE
For many contracting parties, arbitration has become an increasingly
popular form of dispute resolution. The typical means of choosing
arbitration is for the contracting parties to specify in their agreement that
any future disputes will be subject to binding arbitration.30 Survey data31 and
scholars’ claims32 both indicate an increasing use of arbitration clauses in
international commerce. Domestically, the past few decades apparently have
witnessed an increased use of arbitration clauses in a wide variety of
agreements, including securities industry brokerage account contracts,33
employment contracts,34 consumer contracts,35 and even nursing home care
agreements.36
30. Parties can instead contract for nonbinding arbitration, in which case the arbitrator’s
decision is advisory only. Alternatively, after a dispute arises, the parties can enter into an
agreement to resolve the claim through arbitration. This Article ignores such arbitration
agreements and focuses almost exclusively on pre-dispute agreements to subject disputes to
binding arbitration.
31. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 10, at 70; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2, 5 (2008), available at http://www.pwc.
co.uk/en_UK/uk/assets/pdf/pwc-international-arbitration-2008.pdf.
32. BORN, supra note 10, at 70; see also CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & RICHARD W.
NAIMARK, TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH 59 (2005) (finding that 88% of sample of international joint venture agreements
contained arbitration clauses).
33. See David J. Branson, American Party-Appointed Arbitrators—Not the Three Monkeys, 30 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 1, 38 (2004) (noting that use of arbitration clauses in securities industry,
employment, and consumer contracts is now “standard,” and that in general, the use and public
acceptance of such clauses is “pervasive”).
34. Id.; see also Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2011) (commenting on dramatic
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The popularity of arbitration has also led to a dramatic rise in the
reported use of arbitration association services. For example, the
International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration
has had a twenty-fold increase in filed cases between 1956 and 2007.37
Between 1980 and 2007, the number of international arbitrations filed with
the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) increased more than sixfold.38 The caseload of eleven arbitral institutions located throughout the
world increased from a total of 1392 filings in 1993 to 3235 filings in
2007,39 and to 3685 in 2010.40 Between 1997 and 2001, the number of
employment arbitrations filed with the AAA rose by 60%;41 today, an
estimated one-third of nonunion employees are subject to arbitration
clauses for their employment-related disputes.42 Between 2003 and the first
quarter of 2012, 61,702 consumer arbitration cases were concluded under
the auspices of the AAA.43 And, as noted by Gary Born, “the use of
arbitration as a means of resolving new (previously ‘un-arbitrated’)
categories of disputes, including class actions, bilateral investment treaty
claims and human rights claims, attests to its enduring and increasing
popularity.”44
Arbitration can provide a number of advantages for contracting parties.
In the context of cross-border transactions, for example, arbitration can
provide a neutral forum,45 and the decisions rendered by arbitrators are
more easily enforced across borders than are court judgments.46 Moreover,
growth in employment arbitration and citing estimate that for at least one third of nonunion
employees, disputes must be resolved in arbitration).
35. Branson, supra note 33, at 38; Laura K. Bailey, Note, The Demise of Arbitration Agreements
in Long-Term Care Contracts, 75 MO. L. REV. 181, 181 (2010).
36. Bailey, supra note 35, at 181.
37. BORN, supra note 10, at 69.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Statistics: Case Statistics - 2010, H.K. INT’L ARB. CTR., http://www.hkiac.org/index.php/
en/hkiac-statistics/case-statistics (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
41. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An
Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44, 44 (2004).
42. Colvin, supra note 34, at 2.
43. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION STATISTICS, available at http://www.
adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_020811 (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
44. BORN, supra note 10, at 70 (footnotes omitted).
45. See id. at 2 (stating that international commercial arbitration successfully provides a
“fair, neutral, expert and efficient means of resolving difficult and contentious transnational
problems”).
46. This difference is due to the fact that more than 140 nations are parties to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which
obligates each nation to enforce arbitral awards regardless of where they are rendered.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 1, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/
UNTS/Volume%20330/v330.pdf; see also Status of Convention on the Recognition and
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arbitration is a much more heterogeneous phenomenon than is court
determination, and often the parties are permitted to contract over the
particular features of arbitration. This freedom enables the parties to
customize the arbitration process to suit their needs.47
For example, the parties can ensure that the dispute is heard by
decision makers with industry experience who will be familiar with relevant
custom and trade usage.48 In addition, arbitration can be (although often is
not) streamlined to provide relatively cheap and speedy resolution of
claims,49 and it can enable the parties to avoid juries,50 tailor the parties’
rights to engage in discovery,51 eliminate punitive damage awards,52 shift fees

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://
treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&lang=en
(last visited Aug. 17, 2012) (listing the countries that are participants to the agreement). In
contrast, there is no widespread international convention that forces nations to enforce one
another’s court judgments. A recently concluded Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements would require nations to enforce court judgments rendered in a court designated
in a contractual choice-of-court clause. Hague Convention on Court of Choice Agreements,
June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294. However, this Convention has not yet come into force, and
some wonder whether it will ever do so. See Stephen B. Burbank, A Tea Party at the Hague?, 18
SW. J. INT’L L. 629 (2012).
47. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE 5 (2007), available at http://www.foreclosuremediationfl.adr.org/si.asp?
id=4125 (“The parties are free to customize and refine the basic arbitration procedures to meet
their particular needs.”).
48. ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., ARBITRATION 5 (3d ed. 2006).
49. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 47, at 16, 32 (providing sample arbitration
clauses designed to help ensure quick dispute resolution). On the question of whether
arbitration is in fact faster and cheaper than litigation, see RAU ET AL., supra note 48, at 5
(arguing that it is); Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 579
(2008) (discussing the cost savings arbitration provides); David S. Schwartz, Mandatory
Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1268 & n.53 (2009) (assuming, for the
purposes of the author’s analysis, that “process costs are, on the whole, less in arbitration than
litigation,” with the caveat that the author suspects that the “cost savings in arbitration are often
exaggerated”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 460
(1988) (lawyer surveys indicate that arbitration tends to be faster and cheaper than litigation).
But see W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 29–36
(3d ed. 2000) (recognizing that some participating in arbitration governed by the International
Chamber of Commerce have criticized the process for being too costly); Christian A. Atwood,
Creative Approaches To Financing Company M&A in a Brave New (Unlevered) World, in DEALING WITH
M&A FINANCING AND RISK IN A CHANGING MARKET 25, 33 (2010) (providing that author’s
personal experience suggests that arbitration is no faster or cheaper than litigation);
Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 813, 840 (2008) (stating that the empirical evidence is too limited to draw
definitive conclusion about relative costs of arbitration and litigation).
50. Randall Thomas, Erin O’Hara & Kenneth Martin, Arbitration Clauses in CEO Employment
Contracts: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 959, 972 (2010).
51. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 47, at 30–31 (providing sample clauses to address
document discovery and the taking of depositions).
52. See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 94 (2009).
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and costs amongst the parties,53 help ensure confidentiality regarding the
details of the dispute,54 provide a right to appeal awards to an appellate
panel,55 and provide relative certainty about the governing law of the
contract.56 In general, arbitrators possess the authority provided to them by
the association chosen for arbitration, which typically includes the powers
that a judge would possess, but the parties’ agreement can further customize
the exercise of an arbitrator’s authority.57
There is little empirical evidence regarding the degree to which
contracting parties actually do customize their arbitration clauses.
Christopher Drahozal’s studies of franchise contracts and (along with Peter
B. Rutledge) consumer credit card agreements indicate that companies
often carefully address several possible features of arbitration, but they also
tend to remain silent regarding several possible issues that could be
addressed. Regarding franchise contracts, only about 10% of the arbitration
clauses addressed the arbitration award’s standard of review, and only about
20% of the contracts addressed the governing rules for discovery, but
approximately 96% of the contracts specified the location of the arbitration
proceeding.58 By 2007, approximately 60% of franchise contract arbitration
provisions specified the number of arbitrators, 70% provided time limits for
filing claims, 85% restricted the award of punitive damages, 85% also
addressed the allocation of the costs of arbitration, and almost 90%
addressed the availability of class arbitration.59
In contrast, a sample of 293 standard-form credit card agreements
indicated that the drafting patterns overlapped with, but were also somewhat
distinct from, the franchise agreements. The Rutledge and Drahozal study
found that 94% of arbitration clauses addressed the number of arbitrators,
but only 42% of issuers addressed the allocation of the costs of arbitration.60

53. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 47, at 35 (providing sample clauses to address
allocation of attorneys’ fees). Our CEO employment contracts commonly provide costallocation provisions in the arbitration clause. See infra Table 4.
54. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 47, at 36 (providing sample clauses requiring the
parties to maintain confidentiality regarding the details of the dispute).
55. Id. at 37 (providing sample language that would create a right of appeal in
arbitration).
56. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 52, at 87–88. Arbitration-association rules typically
require the arbitrator to apply the law chosen by the parties, in contrast to courts, which tend to
apply a discretionary standard to the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses. Id.
57. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 47, at 5 (“If the parties agree on a procedure that
conflicts with otherwise applicable AAA rules, the AAA will almost always respect the wishes of
the parties.”); id. at 32–33 (providing sample provisions for arbitration agreements specifying
or limiting remedies that arbitrators can award); id. at 36 (providing sample provisions
requiring arbitrators to issue a reasoned award).
58. Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 21, at 102–14.
59. Id.
60. Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, BYU L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 31, 33), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101399.
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Nearly half of these contracts addressed party rights to challenge the award
in front of an arbitral appeals panel, but only about 2% stated that the
parties had an obligation to keep the details of any dispute confidential, only
2% provided for limits in discovery, and only 4% provided time limits for
filing claims. The very small incidence of these latter provisions is likely due
to the fact that some arbitration associations will not hear consumer
arbitrations unless they satisfy minimum standards of fairness to the
consumer,61 and some courts will strike arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts if they appear to be unfairly one-sided.62
Although growing in popularity, arbitration is not well suited for all
contracting parties. For example, when at least one party wishes to rely on
the certainty of the legal principles that will be applied to the case,63 or
forecasts a potential need for assistance to foreclose on property,64 courts
may be preferred. In addition, because of the very limited ability to obtain
judicial review of arbitral awards,65 a company concerned about very large
judgments relative to the value of the company might prefer the appeals
process available in courts.66 In their study of material contracts filed with
the SEC, Eisenberg and Miller found very low rates of the use of arbitration
clauses in several types of high-level business contracts where applicable
legal rules are relatively well developed.67 They found virtually no use of
arbitration clauses in trust agreements, pooling and service agreements, and

61. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1998), available at
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_005014.
62. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 60.
63. See Hylton, supra note 23, at 231.
64. See, e.g., R. Wilson Freyermuth, Foreclosure by Arbitration?, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 459, 480–82
(2010) (noting lack of arbitration clauses in secured mortgage agreements, but providing no
satisfactory explanation for their absence).
65. The grounds for modifying or vacating an arbitral award pursuant to an agreement
covered by the FAA are found in section 10 of that statute and include corruption, fraud or
undue means, evident partiality, arbitrator misconduct, or excess use of arbitral authority. 9
U.S.C. § 10 (2006); see also Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994)
(“[I]n reviewing arbitral awards, a district or appellate court is limited to determining ‘whether
the arbitrators did the job they were told to do—not whether they did it well, or correctly, or
reasonably, but simply whether they did it.’” (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac
R.R. Co. v. Transp. Commc’ns Int’l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 1992))); Eljer Mfg., Inc.
v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1253–54 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Errors in the arbitrator’s
interpretation of law or findings of fact do not merit reversal under this standard. Nor does an
insufficiency of evidence supporting the decision permit us to disturb the arbitrator’s order.”
(internal citations omitted)); Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (“It is well-settled that a court’s power to vacate an arbitration award must be extremely
limited . . . .”).
66. Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
905, 908 (2010).
67. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study
of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335,
350 (2007).
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bond indentures, and only about 5% use of arbitration clauses in service
agreements, about 12% use for securities purchases, and 19% use in merger
agreements.68
We studied the use of arbitration clauses in the context of CEO
employment contracts to determine how commonly these parties choose to
have their disputes arbitrated and to glean some indication of whether the
use of arbitration clauses in these contracts is growing over time. We were
interested in learning about whether the use of arbitration clauses depends
on either the industry type or the primary location of the firm. Regarding
the specific details of arbitration agreements, we wanted to observe the
extent to which arbitration agreements are customized in CEO employment
contracts, and we sought a determination of what factors might influence
this customization.
We also sought to determine the extent to which individually negotiated
contracts respond to the desirability of otherwise applicable state laws. For
example, one finding of our study is that contracts involving firms primarily
located in California are more likely to include an arbitration clause. This
increased use might well result from the fact that California courts will not
provide a firm with some of the legal protections that it seeks, including
enforcement of noncompete provisions in an employment contract.69 The
increased use of arbitration clauses by California firms is particularly
noteworthy given that, as discussed below, California courts are especially
hostile to arbitration clauses in employment contracts. This hostility might,
in other circumstances, lead firms to use arbitration clauses less rather than
more often.
B. COURT REGULATION OF AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
When parties do enter into a written agreement to arbitrate their
disputes, a strong federal pro-arbitration policy ensures that their choice will
be respected in most cases. In 1925, Congress passed the FAA,70 which
provides for the enforcement of both arbitration clauses and arbitration
awards found in contracts “evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”71
The FAA instructs courts to stay any pending court proceeding and to
issue an order to compel arbitration if one of the parties seeks to enforce an
arbitration agreement.72 Congress amended the FAA to add Chapter 273
after the United States joined the New York Convention, which requires

68. Id. at 351.
69. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not To Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 607–09 (1999).
70. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2006).
71. Id. § 2.
72. Id. §§ 3–4.
73. Id. §§ 201–08.
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member nations to enforce arbitration agreements and awards.74 Chapter 2
provides protections to contracting parties who enter into commercial
agreements with a “reasonable relationship” to “one or more foreign
states.”75 The Supreme Court has held that the FAA binds state as well as
federal courts.76 And for international commercial relationships, Chapter 2
provides an automatic right to the defendant to remove a case to federal
court for enforcement of the arbitration agreement or award.77
In order for the arbitration agreement to be enforced, however, the
dispute must involve a subject matter that is capable of resolution by
arbitration.78 It is not uncommon for the governments of other nations to
determine that in order to protect certain important public rights or the
interests of third parties, some claims are not referable to arbitration.79
Elsewhere, common forms of nonarbitrable subject matter include criminal
offenses, consumer employment disputes, and claims involving intellectual
property and domestic relations.80
In the United States, however, the Supreme Court has progressively
limited the circumstances under which a court can determine that a dispute
is nonarbitrable, in both the international and domestic contexts. For
example, the Supreme Court has determined that federal securities act
claims can be arbitrated, notwithstanding language in the federal statutes
that forbids parties to waive any of their statutory rights.81 The Court has
reasoned that arbitration is merely a venue for dispute resolution and does
not necessarily entail a diminution of legal protection.82 In addition,
antitrust claims,83 RICO claims,84 and claims under the Age Discrimination

74. See supra note 46.
75. 9 U.S.C. § 202.
76. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
77. 9 U.S.C. § 205. Suits involving domestic contracts containing arbitration agreements
are removable to federal court only if they involve an independent federal question or if the
case satisfies the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.
78. See BORN, supra note 10, at 767 (“Both international arbitration conventions and
national law provide that agreements to arbitrate such ‘non-arbitrable’ matters need not
necessarily be given effect and that arbitral awards concerning such matters need not
necessarily be recognized.” (footnotes omitted)).
79. Id. at 768.
80. Id.
81. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506, 514–17 (1974).
82. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481.
83. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). The
holding in Mitsubishi was confined to international agreements, but the lower courts have
uniformly held that antitrust claims arising under domestic contracts can also be arbitrated. See
BORN, supra note 10, at 785 n.1137, 793 n.1170 (citing several cases).
84. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
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and Employment Act85 are all arbitrable. More generally, the Court has
stated that “[i]t is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement.”86 In fact, earlier this year in a case involving federal
consumer credit card regulations, the Supreme Court suggested that federal
law claims should be deemed arbitrable unless Congress specifically provides
otherwise.87
The Supreme Court has similarly curtailed state power to limit the proarbitration policy embedded in the FAA, finding that state laws that deem
claims nonarbitrable are preempted.88 Furthermore, state procedural laws
designed to make sure that parties to adhesion contracts have notice that
the agreement is subject to arbitration are preempted under the FAA.89
State laws that apply only to arbitration agreements are not permitted.90 And
state laws that hinder the purposes and objectives of the FAA’s proarbitration policy apparently are also preempted, even if they are not
directed solely at arbitration.91
The only situation under which a court can refuse to enforce an
arbitration clause in an agreement governed by the FAA is when, under § 2
of the FAA, the court finds “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”92 Grounds for refusing to enforce such
arbitration agreements must therefore derive from generally applicable
contract doctrines, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.93
Unconscionability is a creature of state law, so its contours vary by
jurisdiction. As a general matter, however, contract provisions can be struck
down in whole or in part if the agreement is infected with elements of both
procedural and substantive unconscionability such that it appears to the
court that enforcing the contract as written would be fundamentally unfair.94

85. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27, 35 (1991).
86. Id. at 26.
87. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668–73 (2012).
88. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04 (2012) (striking
state prohibition on arbitration of wrongful death claims brought against nursing homes);
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56, 58 (1995) (striking state law
that disenabled arbitration of claims involving punitive damages); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483, 491 (1987) (holding that the California Labor Law, which provided that wage collection
actions were nonarbitrable, is preempted by the FAA); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
10 (1984) (striking law that prohibited arbitration of state financial investment statute claims).
89. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (striking Montana statute that
required that contracts with arbitration clauses provide conspicuous notice of the clause on the
first page of the contract).
90. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349–50, 356 (2008) (striking state regulation
empowering state commission to decide scope of arbitration); Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681.
91. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
92. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
93. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687.
94. See generally GEORGE W. KUNEY & ROBERT M. LLOYD, CONTRACTS: TRANSACTIONS AND
LITIGATION 309–10 (2d ed. 2008).
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Procedural unconscionability is present when a party lacks a meaningful
choice or there is some defect in the bargaining process that causes a court
to question the true assent of the party to the terms of the contract.95
Substantive unconscionability is present when the terms of the bargain
unreasonably favor one party.96 Some courts have determined that contracts
of adhesion, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to one of the parties, carry
with them some procedural unconscionability and that terms in contracts of
adhesion can be struck down if they appear to be oppressive or unfairly onesided.97
Courts have used the unconscionability doctrine in the context of
contracts of adhesion, including both consumer and employment contracts,
to ensure that the arbitration clause does not effectively deprive the
nondrafting party of her ability to vindicate her claims.98 For example,
arbitration clauses that force a party to an adhesion contract to travel long
distances or otherwise incur prohibitively expensive costs in order to
arbitrate claims can be struck down as unconscionable.99 In addition,
arbitration clauses may be deemed unconscionable when coupled with a
limitation of the remedies available to consumers.100 Courts will scrutinize
individual arbitration agreements for a determination of whether the
process for choosing arbitrators appears to be designed to produce nonneutral decision makers.101 If an arbitration clause provides only one party
special procedural advantages in arbitration, the clause can likewise be
deemed unconscionable. These last two features were present in the
arbitration clause used by Hooters of America, Inc. during the 1990s.102
Hooters created a list of “acceptable arbitrators” from which the parties
would choose, and it could modify that list at any time. Moreover, under the
arbitration provision, the employee was required to provide the employer
with notice of the claims as well as details of the claims and was thereafter
forbidden to raise additional claims later, but these rules did not apply to

95. CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 570 (5th
ed. 2003).
96. Id. at 568, 570.
97. See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003); Flores v.
Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 381–82 (Ct. App. 2002).
98. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998) (striking
requirement that consumer proceed to arbitration at International Chamber of Commerce
(“ICC”) because the expenses associated with filing a claim with the ICC rendered the chosen
forum financially prohibitive).
99. Cf. Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (recognizing these
grounds for invalidating an arbitration agreement but placing the burden of proof on the party
seeking to invalidate the clause).
100. Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 319
F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
101. Hayes v. County Bank, 713 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
102. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939 (4th Cir. 1999).
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the employer. In addition, the employee was required to provide the
employer with a list of witnesses and a summary of facts known about each,
but the employer was subject to no corresponding duty. Finally, the
employer—but not the employee—was provided with rights to appeal the
arbitrator’s decision to a court. Because the arbitration clause had features
that increased the likelihood that the employer would prevail, it was struck
down as “egregiously unfair.”103
C. AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
A number of factors have combined to cause some courts to use
whatever tools they may to carefully scrutinize agreements to arbitrate
employment disputes. First, states have little ability to enact laws designed to
prevent employers from using adhesion contracts to force employees to
arbitrate their employment disputes. The Supreme Court has determined
that even statutory nondiscrimination suits are subject to arbitration, and
state laws directed at preserving particular state employment claims for
courts are preempted by the FAA.104 Second, employment arbitration is on
the rise, raising concerns about the employers’ motivations for inserting
these clauses into employment contracts.105 For example, some charge that
arbitration clauses are drafted to effectively deprive employees of their
rights.106 Along the same lines, some scholars object to the effective
privatization of civil rights and other discrimination claims in arbitration.107
In short, the claim is that employers prefer arbitration because, relative to
employees, they fare better in arbitration than in litigation.
The available empirical evidence on case win rates does not provide
clear guidance on the matter. Two studies conducted in the 1990s showed
higher employee win rates in arbitration than in litigation.108 In contrast, a
recent study comparing outcomes of employment disputes in litigation and
arbitration show that employee win rates tend to be higher in litigation.109
Another study found that results for high-wage employees differ significantly
from results for low-wage employees. High-wage employees appear to fare as
well in arbitration as in courts. Low-wage employees fare relatively worse
than their higher paid counterparts in arbitration, but they seem to be
103. Id. at 938.
104. See supra Part II.B.
105. See supra Part I.
106. David E. Feller, Fender Bender or Train Wreck?: The Collision Between Statutory Protection of
Individual Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of the Federal Arbitration Act, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
561 (1997).
107. Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in
the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment
Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29 (1998).
108. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination, DISP. RESOL. J.
Oct.–Dec. 1995, at 40; Maltby, supra note 107.
109. Colvin, supra note 34, at 6.
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practically shut out of courts due to the fact that their lower-value claims fail
to attract counsel.110 Of course, even if we had reliable information on
relative employee win rates in arbitration and litigation, the two categories
of cases are subject to very different selection pressures, making the
comparison not terribly useful.111 Nonetheless, concerns about the
motivations behind the employer’s unilateral choice persist.
When employees win, empirical studies show that overall the amounts
that they recover are substantially higher in litigation than in arbitration.112
One study found that although this difference existed for lower wage
employees, there was no statistically significant difference in mean or
median awards in arbitration and at trial for higher wage employees.113 Here
too, selection effects cause concern over the meaning of any difference.
Still other critics of employment arbitration focus on a potential repeatplayer effect. Employers with multiple cases in front of the same arbitration
association fare better in arbitration than do employers that do not arbitrate
multiple cases.114 Moreover, employers that arbitrate multiple cases with the
same arbitrator tend to fare better, on average, than employers that arbitrate
multiple cases with different arbitrators.115 The concern is that when
employers effectively pick the arbitration association and have greater
knowledge about potential arbitrators, they can produce results biased in
their favor, especially if arbitrators want to be selected again in the future.116
Defenders of employment arbitration counter that these concerns are
overblown and that arbitration can provide a quick, informal, and low-cost
means for employees to bring their employment claims.117 Empirical
evidence indicates that employment arbitration cases are resolved
substantially sooner than are litigated employment cases, regardless of the
type of claim alleged.118 Arbitration defenders also argue that arbitration
110. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 41, at 44.
111. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 199 (1997); Stephen Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other
Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735 (2001).
112. Colvin, supra note 34, at 6; Maltby, supra note 107, at 48.
113. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 41, at 44.
114. Bingham, supra note 111, at 209–10; Colvin, supra note 34, at 13.
115. Colvin, supra note 34, at 14–15.
116. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 111, at 192–94; Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players,
Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29
MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV.
449 (1996).
117. See, e.g., David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes:
Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 99 (1999).
118. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 41, at 51 (finding that mean and median times in
arbitration ranged from seven to thirteen months while mean and median times in both state
and federal courts exceeded twenty months).
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better enables the parties to resolve disputes while preserving a positive
working relationship and that employer cost savings can be rechanneled
into more generous employee compensation and benefits.119 But even
defenders of employment arbitration acknowledge that some contractual
provisions and practices could prove harmful to employees.120
Persistent concerns about employment arbitration have caused some
countries to refuse to enforce arbitration clauses in employment
contracts.121 During the past few years, Congress has regularly considered
but not passed an Arbitration Fairness Act that would also preclude courts
from enforcing such clauses.122 As a matter of current governing federal law
in the U.S.,123 however, state and federal courts must enforce arbitration
clauses in employment contracts to the same extent as any other arbitration
clause.124
In response to the controversy surrounding employment arbitration,
some arbitration associations have made efforts to self-regulate. To better
protect employee interests, and to help preserve the validity of employment
arbitration, the major U.S. arbitration associations have drafted protocols
that each employer must satisfy as a prerequisite to the association handling
its employment disputes. For example, JAMS provides Employment
Arbitration Minimum Standards that require, among other things, that
(1) all remedies available under applicable law remain available to the
employee; (2) the employee is provided with at least minimally adequate
discovery rights; (3) fees and costs incurred by the employee are reasonable
and not so large as to preclude employee claim prosecution; and (4) the

119. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 111, at 754 & n.92 (noting that fans of the Gilmer case argue
that employment arbitration benefits everyone).
120. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements To Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997); Sherwyn et al., supra note 117, at 147 (acknowledging that
mandatory arbitration is not perfect). For models of employment arbitration producing both
efficiencies and inefficiencies, see Matthew T. Bodie, Questions About the Efficiency of Employment
Arbitration Agreements, 39 GA. L. REV. 1 (2004), and Hylton, supra note 23.
121. Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory
Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831
(2002). One author suggests that the high union density in other countries makes labor courts
cost-effective and attractive, resulting in less demand for labor arbitration. See Samuel
Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753, 793
(1990).
122. For current text, see Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011).
123. Section 1 of the FAA contains language that could have been interpreted to exclude
employment arbitration from its coverage. In defining the scope of applicability of the FAA,
Congress provided “but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to exclude
only interstate transportation workers. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
124. See supra Part II.B.
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arbitrator provides a written award containing reasons for her decision.125
The AAA Employment Due Process Protocol provides employees with
similar rights to discovery, reasonable fees, and costs and remedies available
under applicable law in their disputes involving statutory rights.126
Some state courts use the unconscionability doctrine to independently
police problematic terms in employment arbitration agreements, including
those that provide for potentially biased arbitrator selection, impose
prohibitively expensive costs to arbitrate, or so limit the employee’s rights in
arbitration that effective claim prosecution or effective remedies are
precluded. Other provisions that unilaterally restrict an employee’s right in
arbitration are also heavily scrutinized. For example, a unilateral provision
precluding the award of punitive damages to the employee only was similarly
struck down as substantively unconscionable.127 And, in response to
concerns about the repeat-player problem, California courts have refused to
enforce arbitration clauses when the arbitral forum chosen by the employer
is so small that the employer can at least implicitly exert pressure on the
arbitrators to render decisions in its favor.128
In addition to these measures, some courts also require mutuality in the
parties’ agreement to arbitrate. In fact, at least one court has described
mutuality as “the paramount consideration in assessing conscionability.”129 If
an arbitration clause requires only the employee but not the employer to
take claims to arbitration, then these courts will strike the arbitration
clause.130 Mutuality helps to ensure fairness: “If the arbitration system

125. JAMS, JAMS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES (2009), available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_employment_
arbitration_rules-2009.pdf. These minimum standards do not apply to individually negotiated
agreements. Id. at 4.
126. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (2011), available at
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/lee/documents/document/mdaw/mdaz/
~edisp/adrstg_004368.pdf.
127. See Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 766–67 (Wash. 2004).
128. See Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 678–79 (Ct. App. 2002) (noting
that employer’s choice of arbitral forum resulted in only eight available arbitrators in the
relevant district and finding that the potential for the repeat-player effect to influence the
decision was one factor in its decision to strike the arbitration clause).
129. Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 436 (Ct. App. 2004).
130. See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003); Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000); Frye v. Speedway Chevrolet Cadillac, 321 S.W.3d 429, 441–
42 & n.21 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (questioning but not deciding whether arbitration clause is
sufficiently mutual when employer does not obligate itself to submit its disputes to arbitration);
cf. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004) (striking
an arbitration agreement in consumer contract obligating only the consumer to arbitrate);
Simpson v. Grimes, 2002-0869 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/21/03); 849 So. 2d 740, abrogated by
Aguillard v. Auction Mgmt. Corp., 2004-2804, 2004-2857 (La. 6/29/05); 908 So. 2d 1. But see
Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v.
Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 453 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding one-sided obligation to arbitrate);

2012]

CUSTOMIZING EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION

153

established by the employer is indeed fair, then the employer as well as the
employee should be willing to submit claims to arbitration.”131 Even when
the arbitration clause appears to obligate both parties to participate in
binding arbitration, courts can strike it as unconscionable when the
employer reserves for itself an unfettered right to modify or to terminate the
arbitration plan without prior notice to the employee.132 In these cases, it
appears that the mutual obligation to arbitrate is illusory.133 When the
arbitration provision is found to lack mutuality, the employee is permitted to
proceed with litigation notwithstanding the presence of an arbitration
agreement.
Even if the parties appear to mutually commit to arbitrate disputes,
courts will sometimes strike an arbitration clause if the drafter carves out a
right to bring claims to court and the claims carved out appear to represent
the entirety of the drafter’s claims. Consider, for example, the arbitration
clause at issue in Sutton’s Steel and Supply, Inc. v. BellSouth Mobility, Inc.134
BellSouth’s standard-form contract included an arbitration clause that
obligated both it and the customer to resolve disputes in arbitration, but in a
separate clause, the company reserved the right to bring court actions
against the customer to collect debts owed.135 The court found that this
carveout compromised the mutuality of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate,
especially because it seemed implausible that BellSouth would ever have
claims against its customers other than claims for the collection of moneys
owed.136 In effect, the carveout took back the company’s promise to arbitrate
claims. Similar reasoning is sometimes used in the context of arbitration
clauses in employment contracts,137 although it is less clear at what point an
employer has carved out all conceivable claims against an employee.

Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 800 A.2d 872 (N.J. 2002) (upholding potentially unilateral
arbitration clause); Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc., 156 P.3d 156 (Or. Ct. App. 2007)
(holding that it is not unconscionable to require only employee to arbitrate where the terms of
the arbitration appear fair to the employee).
131. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 692.
132. Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002); Floss v. Ryan’s
Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 315–16 (6th Cir. 2000); Gibson v. Neighborhood
Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997); Snow v. BE & K Constr. Co., 126 F. Supp.
2d 5, 14–15 (D. Me. 2001); Gibson v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091 (Alaska 2009);
Frye, 321 S.W.3d at 442 & n.21; Redmond v. Big Sandy Furniture, Inc., No. 08CA12, 2008 WL
4966549 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2008); Salazar v. Citadel Commc’ns Corp., 2004-NMSC-013,
135 N.M. 447, 90 P.3d 466; J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 2003).
133. See, e.g., Dumais, 299 F.3d at 1219; Salazar, 2004-NMSC-013, 91 12; Webster, 128 S.W.3d
at 232.
134. Sutton’s Steel & Supply, Inc. v. BellSouth Mobility, Inc., 00-511, 00-898 (La. App. 3
Cir. 12/13/00); 776 So. 2d 589, abrogated by Aguillard v. Auction Mgmt. Corp., 2004-2804,
2004-2857 (La. 6/29/05); 908 So. 2d 1
135. Id. at p. 9–11, 776 So. 2d 596–97.
136. Id. at p. 10–11, 766 So. 2d 597.
137. Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 676–77 (Ct. App. 2002).
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In truth, courts do not agree on the doctrinal foundation for mutuality.
Some place the issue within unconscionability, reasoning that it is
fundamentally unfair for an employer to force employees to submit claims to
arbitration without itself agreeing to submit its claims to arbitration.138
Other courts treat the issue as one of consideration,139 reasoning that the
arbitration agreement is a separate agreement from the remainder of the
employment agreement and that therefore something other than the terms
of the employment contract must support the employee’s promise to
arbitrate. The consideration doctrine is a blunter regulatory tool than is
unconscionability. Courts using the consideration doctrine must either
enforce or refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement,140 whereas those
using unconscionability have the authority to enforce part of the arbitration
clause, while striking the portion perceived to be unfair.141 More importantly
for present purposes, under consideration analysis, courts typically do not
inquire into adequacy or fairness; anything given by the employer, whether a
return promise or a small bonus, would be sufficient.142 For courts using the
consideration doctrine, then, the employee’s promise to arbitrate claims can
be supported by a promise on the part of the employer to submit any claims
to arbitration.143 But for courts using the unconscionability doctrine to
scrutinize the agreement, more obligation on the part of the employer may
be necessary to establish fundamental fairness.
In particular, courts using the unconscionability doctrine are more
likely to look past the agreement’s bilateral arbitration obligations to inquire
into whether the drafter has used carveout provisions to reserve a greater
(albeit qualified) right to resort to courts. California courts, in particular,
express concern that when the employer carves out a right to bring even a
small number of its claims to court, it is preserving for itself a procedural
advantage not realistically offered to employees. In several cases, the
California courts have refused to order an employee to arbitrate her claims
138. See supra note 130.
139. See supra note 130; see also Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 27
S.W.3d 361 (Ark. 2000) (consumer loan agreement).
140. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) (listing consideration as
requirement of contract).
141. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2012) (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to
avoid any unconscionable result.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (“If a
contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid
any unconscionable result.”).
142. See KNAPP ET AL., supra note 95, at 62 (discussing adequacy of consideration
requirement).
143. Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999).
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on grounds that the employer has tainted the arbitration clause by including
such carveouts. Almost always, the carveouts are for the very types of claims
that we commonly observe in CEO employment contracts. Specifically,
carveouts rendering the arbitration clause substantively unconscionable have
included rights to bring the following types of claims to court: noncompeteclause claims;144 claims involving intellectual-property rights;145 and
confidentiality clause or other proprietary-information claims.146 On the
other hand, carveouts for preliminary relief that mirror the rights to such
relief already afforded to arbitrated disputes under state law are
permitted.147
On the surface, California has not rendered these unilateral carveouts
categorically impermissible. California courts have consistently stated that
carveouts and other forms of nonmutuality will not render an arbitration
clause unconscionable if the employer can justify the carveouts with
evidence of a legitimate business need.148 However, we are not aware of a
single case where a California court has found the employer’s business
justification to be sufficient to preserve the arbitration clause.149
In Mercuro v. Superior Court,150 for example, the arbitration clause
included carveouts for injunctive or other equitable relief for unfair
competition, unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets, or violation of
144. See, e.g., Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (Ct. App. 2004); Stirlen v. Supercuts,
Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App. 1997); see also Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr.
3d 663 (Ct. App. 2004) (unfair competition claims); Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr.
2d 671 (Ct. App. 2002) (fee sharing).
145. See, e.g., Kalmbach v. Sportsmobile W., Inc., No. F054648, 2008 WL 4988663 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 25, 2008); Fitz, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (intellectual property); Martinez, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d
663 (trade secrets); Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422 (Ct. App. 2004)
(trade secrets); O’Hare v. Mun. Res. Consultants, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116 (Ct. App. 2003) (trade
secrets); Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (intellectual-property violations and trade secrets);
Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (patent infringement).
146. See, e.g., Fitz, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (confidentiality-clause claims); Martinez, 12 Cal. Rptr.
3d 663 (misuse or disclosure of confidential information); Abramson, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88
(confidential and proprietary information); O’Hare, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116 (confidentialityclause claims); Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (confidential information); Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr.
2d 138 (improper use of confidential information).
147. See, e.g., Clarus Sys., Inc. v. Variphy, Inc., No. A115360, 2007 WL 576149, at *1 (Cal.
Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2007); Inter@ctive, Inc. v. Cubic Transp. Sys., Inc., No. D047096, 2007 WL
178429, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2007); cf. Htay Htay Chin v. Advanced Fresh Concepts
Franchise Corp., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547 (Ct. App. 2011) (franchise contract).
148. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal.
2000) (inference of unconscionability can be overcome if employer has reasonable justification
for the nonmutuality); Fitz, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 103 (upholding nonmutual arbitration
agreement only if the stronger party can show, through the contract or other facts, that
“business realities” create a special need for the advantage); cf. Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
677–78 (rejecting employer’s proffered evidence of business justification as insufficient).
149. See, e.g., Fitz, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88; O’Hare, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116; Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr.
2d 671; Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138.
150. Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671.
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intellectual-property rights. The employer attempted unsuccessfully to justify
the carveouts on the ground that monetary damages for misappropriation of
its intellectual-property assets would be difficult to calculate and that in any
event money damages would not protect it from further misappropriation.151
The court rejected the employer’s argument in part by stating that it had no
evidence to support its business justification.152 This and other questionable
provisions in the arbitration clause resulted in the clause being struck in its
entirety.153
Consider also Fitz v. NCR Corp.154 The arbitration clause at issue carved
out disputes involving the parties’ confidentiality or noncompete
agreements and those involving its intellectual-property rights.155 In
addition, the clause carved out some employee claims like worker’s
compensation and unemployment insurance proceedings, as well as agency
proceedings for discrimination or other civil rights violations.156 The court
concluded that the employer could not justify its carveouts by a need for
provisional relief in courts because California law already gives parties some
limited ability to obtain provisional relief.157 The company had cited to some
cases where employees rather than employers have brought noncompete
and intellectual-property-rights claims to court, but the court nevertheless
found it problematic that most such claims are brought by employers.158 The
employer argued that it had only carved out a fraction of its possible claims
and had obligated itself to arbitrate others, including theft and
embezzlement claims, but the court thought these claims were unlikely.159
Finally, the company argued that it had also agreed to carve out some
employee claims, but the court cited Mercuro to conclude that those claims
would be separately maintained by an administrative agency in any event.160
Here too the court struck the entire arbitration clause from the employment
contract.161
In striking arbitration clauses with carveouts, the California courts have
not confined their role to the protection of low-level employees. The same
scrutiny has been applied to carveouts in the arbitration clause of a franchise
contract,162 and to employment disputes brought by the employer’s vice

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 677–78.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 684.
Fitz, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 104–05.
Id. at 92, 104.
Id. at 106–07.
See Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006).
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president of operations,163 vice president and chief financial officer,164 and
president and CEO.165 This extension is remarkable, given that procedural
unconscionability is much less likely in the employment contracts of
company executives.166
To our knowledge no other courts have subjected carveouts to
arbitration agreements in employment contracts to the same exacting
scrutiny as have the California courts. One non-California court struck an
arbitration clause with carveouts similar to those found in the California
cases, but the court interpreted the carveout provision as completely
eliminating any obligation on the part of the employer to arbitrate its
claims.167 In addition, the JAMS Employment Arbitration Minimum
Standards168 impose a mutuality requirement on arbitration clauses in
employment contracts, but its requirement is less stringent than California’s.
The Minimum Standards provide that “[b]oth the employer and the
employee must have the same obligation (either to arbitrate or go to court)
with respect to the same kinds of claims.”169 Presumably nothing in this
standard prevents an employer from carving out particular types of claims,
so long as both employer and employee are by the terms of the clause
permitted to bring such claims in court (as was true in Fitz). California
courts often take the lead in scrutinizing arbitration clauses, so California’s
scrutiny of carveouts from employment-contract arbitration agreements
could well spread to other courts.
In this Article we seek a better understanding of the use of carveouts in
the arbitration clauses contained in CEO employment contracts. How
common are carveouts? What types of claims are carved out? Does the
frequency of the use of carveouts depend on the type of firm? Are firms
based in California less likely to carve out claims, given the precedent in
California? And, given that our contracts are heavily negotiated employment
contracts, does their content shed light on the soundness of the California
courts’ reasoning regarding the mutuality of party obligations to arbitrate?
We now turn to our research questions.

163. See Kalmbach v. Sportsmobile W., Inc., No. F054648, 2008 WL 4988663, at *1 (Cal.
Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008)
164. See Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 140 (Ct. App. 1997).
165. See Trivedi v. Curexo Tech. Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804 (Ct. App. 2010).
166. Cf. Guiliano v. Inland Empire Pers., Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 5, 14–16 (Ct. App. 2007)
(holding that protections of Armendariz do not apply in case brought by company executive vice
president and chief financial officer, at least when his dispute involves a right to a multimilliondollar bonus rather than an unwaivable statutory claim).
167. See Hull v. Norcrom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1985).
168. See JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION MINIMUM STANDARDS OF
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2009), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/Documents/
JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Employment_Min_Stds-2009.pdf.
169. Id. at 4.
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III. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS
We begin our empirical analysis with a description of our datacollection procedure and an overview of the prevalence of arbitration
clauses in our sample. We then present some univariate statistics concerning
the use of arbitration clauses, followed by a discussion of the more refined
forms of customization of these clauses. We conclude this section with an
analysis of the use of litigation carveouts in these agreements and the
“California” effect on these provisions.
A. THE CONTRACTS SAMPLE AND THE PREVALENCE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES
We generated a sample of CEO employment contracts by creating a list
of all of the companies included in the S&P 1500 from 1995 to 2005. Using
this list, we examined each of these companies’ mandatory securities-law
filings under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act in the SEC’s EDGAR
database. We employed a privately owned version of this database, Live
Edgar, for ease of manual and electronic search techniques.
Using Live Edgar, we checked each company’s Form 10-K (annual
report) filings to see if the company mentioned that its CEO had an
employment contract. If so, we searched for these employment contracts,
which are attached as an exhibit to one of the firm’s securities filings. If they
exist, these contracts are required disclosures for every registered company.
Whenever we found one of the contracts, we downloaded it and coded it
using a coding system that we created in order to gather the requisite
information. We found a total of 1970 contracts in this search.
We found several different variations in CEO employment contract
types.170 For our purposes, the three most important contract types are
initial contracts, contract amendments, and restated contracts. Initial
contracts are those that are entered into between the company and its new
CEO, or in some cases, by a company and its current CEO when the firm’s
prior relationship with the CEO was not the subject of a written employment
contract. Generally, CEOs and firms enter into initial contracts at the
beginning of their employment relationships.
Contract amendments can be initiated at any time for any reason once
an employment contract is in place. They are typically quite short and affect
only a few terms of the initial (or restated) contract, usually specifying
changes in the CEO’s compensation arrangement. They rarely alter any
noncompensation-related terms of the employment relationship. We did not

170. We made no attempt to include all of the other various contractual agreements that
exist between CEOs and their firms. For example, we did not include change-of-control
agreements in our sample, although some of these agreements include arbitration provisions.
We recognized that these other forms of agreement may affect the employment relationship
between the firm and its managers, but we decided to leave them for a later day in order to
maintain our focus on employment contracts.
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find a single case where these amendments altered the arrangements, or
lack thereof, providing for arbitration of any dispute between the parties.
For this reason, we decided to drop these contract amendments from our
sample. This decision reduced our sample by 1052 observations.
Restated contracts (sometimes called “amended and restated
contracts”) are contracts that are entered into subsequent to the initial
contract, usually after one or more amendments have been made to the
initial contract. A restated contract incorporates all of the changes made in
the various amendments, and it also frequently adds new terms. This new,
integrated document reflects all of the terms of the employment contract
between the CEO and the firm. We included these agreements in our
sample for three reasons. First, in some instances, the initial contracts are
unavailable.171 Second, restated contracts can result in changes to the
arbitration arrangements in the parties’ agreement. Finally, they provide us
with some insight into the “stickiness” of arbitration provisions, that is,
whether their presence in an earlier CEO contract is likely to persist in later
ones.
Next, for some of the variables included in our multivariate analysis, we
needed additional information about the CEOs and their companies. For
this information, we used the Compustat database maintained by Standard
and Poor’s. It contains company-specific descriptive and financial-statement
data for the past twenty years on an annual basis for companies that have
actively traded securities at any point during that time period. The
Compustat database enabled us to collect information about firm
performance, the company’s principal business line, firm size, and the state
of the headquarters for the firms where our CEOs worked. The firm
performance variables are sales and return on capital. Return on capital is
defined as net income divided by capital. Capital is the book value of debt
and equity as reported on the firm’s balance sheet. Return on capital is then
averaged over the five-year period prior to the start date of the CEO’s
compensation contract. After eliminating contracts for which this
information was unavailable, we ended up with 910 contracts in our
sample.172
For each employment contract in our sample, we coded the presence or
absence of an arbitration clause. For each of the employment contracts
containing an arbitration clause, we coded a wide variety of additional
information about the contents of the arbitration provision, including

171. This could happen if the initial contracts were entered into prior to May 6, 1996,
when the SEC mandated that all companies file electronically on the EDGAR database, or if the
company failed to disclose an earlier contract. We searched diligently to find all prior contracts
to confirm wherever possible if they contained an arbitration clause.
172. We could have included all of the CEO employment contracts in our analysis;
however, the absence of the additional data on certain variables would have made it difficult to
test different explanations for the presence or absence of arbitration provisions.
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whether the parties: (1) chose an arbitration association (and if so, which
one); (2) specified the rules of procedure that arbitration would follow;
(3) chose a specific number of arbitrators to resolve disputes; (4) chose a
location for arbitration (and if so, where); (5) contractually allocated the
costs of arbitration; (6) provided a limitations period for filing for
arbitration; (7) addressed rules of discovery or rules of evidence;
(8) contractually prohibited the arbitrator from awarding punitive damages;
(9) were bound to keep the contents of arbitration proceedings
confidential; (10) obligated the arbitrator to issue a written opinion
justifying her decision; and (11) reserved the right to appeal the arbitrator’s
decision to an arbitration-appeal panel or to the courts. In addition, we
coded the contracts for whether the parties carved out a right to have courts
grant preliminary relief and whether the parties carved out particular types
of claims for court resolution, including claims involving the
confidentiality,173
noncompete,174
nonsolicitation,175
and
176
nondisparagement provisions of the agreement.
Turning to the presence or absence of arbitration provisions, we see in
Table 1 that of the 910 contracts studied, 469 (52%) provided for
arbitration of at least some of the parties’ disputes, and their arbitration
provisions typically required both parties to proceed to mandatory, binding
arbitration.177 This proportion is consistent with the results of two earlier
studies by one or more of the authors of this Article.178
In an earlier study by the authors of this Article, we noted that the
overall average of about half masks an upward trend in the use of arbitration
over time—from an observed low of 36% of the contracts in 1997 to a high
of 60% of contracts in 2005.179 A simple linear regression of the percentage
of contracts containing arbitration provisions each year against time
indicated a statistically significant upward slope.180 This trend indicates a

173. Confidentiality provisions state that the executive promises not to disclose certain
information about the firm and its activities.
174. Noncompete provisions bar executives from competing with the company for a period
of time after the termination of their employment position with the company. See Schwab &
Thomas, supra note 28 at 254–57.
175. Nonsolicitation provisions stop departing executives from soliciting employees and
clients of their employer to change their allegiances and move to the new firm where the
executive will be working.
176. Nondispargement clauses are designed to ensure that departing executives do not
make negative comments or statements about their former employer.
177. Arbitration clauses can alternatively provide for optional arbitration or for nonbinding
arbitration, where an arbitrator provides a recommended settlement. None of our contracts
provided for nonbinding arbitration, and only a handful provided for optional arbitration.
178. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 28; Thomas, O’Hara & Martin, supra note 50, at 981.
179. Thomas, O’Hara & Martin, supra note 50, at 981.
180. The t-statistic on the slope was 3.84. Id. at 981 n.71.
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California firms. Using a chi-squared test for statistical significance, we reject
the null hypothesis of no difference.182 This suggests that California firms
are more wary of courts in general than are non-California firms.
We also wanted to know whether information technology firms (“IT
firms”) are more likely to want to arbitrate disputes than other types of firms
(“non-IT firms”). We had no clear hypothesis regarding the question,
however. On the one hand, if IT firms can garner more value from
noncompete clauses that are reliably enforced across state borders, then we
would expect IT firms to choose arbitration more often than non-IT firms,
given that some courts will heavily scrutinize noncompete clauses in
employment contracts and California courts refuse to enforce them
altogether.183 On the other hand, a cursory glance at our collected data
indicated that companies commonly carve out noncompete clauses and
other information-protecting clauses for court resolution. If IT firms
disproportionately rely on such provisions to protect firm value, they might
be inclined to forgo arbitration altogether in order to ensure court
protection of the rights they most value. To test whether there might be a
difference in the use of arbitration clauses for IT firms, our null hypothesis
was that there is no difference. To test this claim, we coded the firms into IT
firms and non-IT firms. The firms were categorized according to whether
they were classified as being in the information technology economic sector
using the Global Industry Classification Standard (“GICS”) as reported in
Compustat. Of the CEO contracts having arbitration clauses, there were 115
CEO contracts for IT firms and 354 CEO contracts for non-IT firms. Table 1
shows that 62% of IT firms had arbitration clauses in their contracts,
whereas only 49% of non-IT firms did. The difference is statistically
significant, indicating that the IT firms have a definite preference for
arbitration.184
B. ARBITRATION PROCEDURE AND COST FINDINGS
We turn next to the contents of the arbitration provisions. We began by
examining whether or not the parties chose a specific arbitration
association. In our sample, when the parties chose arbitration, they almost
always specified an arbitration association that would handle their disputes,
and they also virtually always chose a governing set of procedural rules for
arbitral proceedings. As shown in Table 2, in 435 out of 469 (93%) of the
contracts with arbitration clauses, the parties chose an arbitration
association, and in another 6 contracts specifically selected a method for
arbitration without choosing a specific association (for a total of 441
contracts). Only 28, or about 6%, of the arbitration clauses in our sample

182.
183.
184.

The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Gilson, supra note 69, at 607–09.
These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
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the issue. Moreover, many of their contracts contain arbitration clauses,189
and silence in an arbitration clause does not necessarily indicate that the
American rule would apply by default. Given that the allocation of attorney
fees is most often left to the arbitrator to decide, silence in the context of a
contract with an arbitration clause is much more likely to indicate no
preference regarding the split of attorney fees.190 With silent contracts
categorized as a preference for the American rule, Eisenberg and Miller find
no preference between the American rule and the English rule: 39% of
contracts fall in the former group and 35% of contracts fall in the latter
group.191 Because we have good reason to believe that our silent contracts
most likely indicate no preference, we can directly compare the number of
contracts choosing the American rule, at most 52, with those choosing the
English rule, 162. In our contracts, where parties expressed a clear
preference, they were more than three times as likely to choose the English
rule than the American rule. These contrary results are particularly striking,
given that Eisenberg and Miller hypothesize that relational contracts
(including employment contracts) should be more likely to choose the
American rule.192
C. OTHER FEATURES OF ARBITRATION CUSTOMIZATION
Beyond these three factors—arbitration association, governing rules,
and cost allocation—relatively few contracts customized the features of
future arbitrations. This is clearly illustrated by the data presented in Table
5. In our contracts, 57, or 12%, of the arbitration clauses included a
provision that required the parties to keep confidential the details of a
dispute. Only 47, or 10%, of the arbitration provisions stated that the
arbitrator was required to provide a written statement of her findings.
Roughly the same number of clauses prohibited the arbitrator from
awarding punitive damages. In 30, or 6%, of the arbitration clauses, the
parties agreed to permit discovery and specified how it would be conducted.
We also find that in 21, or 4%, of the clauses, the parties limited the period
of time after a claim arose in which parties could file an arbitration request.
Even more rarely, in 8, or 2%, of the clauses, the parties agreed about what
was permitted testimony in the arbitration hearing. And finally, in only 3, or
0.6%, of the clauses, there were provisions addressing the parties’ right to
appeal an arbitration decision to courts.

189. Id. at 4–5.
190. We say “much more likely” rather than “certainly” in the text because it is possible that
some arbitration associations impose rules on arbitrators for how to allocate costs in the face of
a silent contract, in which case silence could indicate a choice in favor of the association’s rule.
However, many associations do not so constrain the arbitrator.
191. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 187, at 25.
192. Id.
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Although these findings indicate that the parties often carved out
particular types of disputes for court resolution, they underestimate the
extent to which parties actually carved out the particular disputes—for many
of the carveouts we do not know how often the contract clause on which the
carveout was based actually appeared in a contract.196 To get an idea of how
important this effect is, we coded for the presence of two very common (and
therefore anticipated) types of contract provisions: confidentiality clauses
and nonsolicitation provisions. In the case of confidentiality clauses, we
coded contracts for the presence of any provisions requiring the CEO to
keep information about the firm confidential or providing that the CEO
could not disclose certain types of information. We found that 418 of the
469 contracts containing arbitration clauses also contained confidentiality
provisions. Of the 418 contracts with confidentiality provisions, 172, or 41%,
of them carved out these disputes for court resolution. This is somewhat
greater than the 37% (with confidentiality carveouts) of all the contracts
with arbitration clauses (shown in Table 6).
In the case of nonsolicitation clauses, we coded contracts for the
presence of any clause prohibiting the executive from soliciting clients,
customers, suppliers, or employees. We also coded contracts for the
presence of any nonsolicitation carveouts, and found that 345, or 74%, of
these contracts with arbitration clauses contained a nonsolicitation
provision. Breaking this down further, we determined that 145, or 42%, of
these contracts with arbitration provisions carved out disputes involving one
or more of the nonsolicitation provisions. By comparison, Table 6 shows that
employee nonsolicitation carveout clauses were found in 30%, and client
nonsolicitation carveouts were in 22% of all contracts with arbitration
clauses. Here too, the frequency with which disputes involving these clauses
were carved out is actually significantly higher than our initial numbers
indicated.
Based on our analysis in Part II, we wanted to know whether there was a
difference in the likelihood that IT and non-IT firms would carve out
disputes from arbitration. We hypothesized that IT firms would be more
likely to include these carveouts because, relative to non-IT firms, a higher
fraction of the IT firms’ value should turn on its ability to protect
information and innovation. Table 6 shows our findings. Comparing these
two columns of percentages, there are several apparent differences between
the firm types. As we predicted, the presence of at least one carveout is
greater for IT-firm than non-IT-firm contracts (52% vs. 45%), but this
196. For example, while only 7% of the contracts with arbitration clauses carve out disputes
involving the nondisparagement clause of the contract, it is likely that many, and perhaps most,
of these contracts do not contain a nondisparagement provision. What we really need to know
is how many contracts actually include nondisparagement clauses in order to determine how
frequently such claims are carved out for court resolution. Unfortunately, we did not code for
the frequency of nondisparagement clauses.
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difference is present only for one specific category—preliminary injunctive
relief (16% vs. 11%). For all other categories, non-IT-firm contracts are
more likely to include litigation carveouts than are IT-firm contracts. These
results surprised us initially. However, if IT firms are disproportionately
located in California, the “California effect” for carveouts could be driving
our IT-firm results. Our multivariate analysis in the next Part indicates that
this is precisely what is happening.
Turning to the possible “California effect,” the location of the firm’s
business may also have an effect on carveouts. If California law influenced
the contracting parties, then we should see a difference in the use of
carveouts between contracts involving CEOs to be employed at firms
primarily located in California and contracts for CEOs employed at firms
located elsewhere. We hypothesized that contracts involving California firms
would have fewer claim carveouts because the presence of these carveouts,
particularly the presence of multiple such carveouts, can cause the
California courts to strike the arbitration clause altogether. Table 6 presents
the data for California and non-California firms. We first tested a null
hypothesis that there was no difference in the incidence of the use of the
coded carveouts based on whether the firm was primarily located in
California or not. The data show that when comparing the likelihood of
using any carveout in an arbitration provision, non-California firms were
slightly more likely to incorporate any carveout into the provisions (44% of
the California firm contracts compared with 47% of the non-California firm
contracts), but that difference was not statistically significant.
Regarding specific types of carveouts, however, Table 6 shows that nonCalifornia firms were much more likely to incorporate most of the types of
carveouts studied. For example, 25% of non-California firm arbitration
clauses carved out disputes involving the client nonsolicitation clause of the
contract, as compared with only 4% of the California firm provisions.197
Similarly, 35% of the provisions in non-California firm contracts carved out
disputes related to the employee nonsolicitation clause, as compared with
just under 7% of the California firm provisions.198 Non-California firms were
also more likely to carve out disputes involving the confidentiality and
nondisparagement clauses of the agreement, and those differences were
each statistically significant at the 5% confidence level.
Disputes involving the noncompetition clause of the agreement were
carved out in 38% of non-California firms compared with 5% of California
firms.199 This difference could have multiple causes, however. Given that
California courts will not enforce employee noncompete provisions, firms
located in California might be more likely to steer clear of asking courts to

197.
198.
199.

This difference is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
We find that this difference is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
Again, this difference is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
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enforce these provisions even without the unconscionable-employeearbitration-clause wrinkle.
In contrast to these carveout provisions, Table 6 shows that California
firms were more likely than non-California firms to incorporate a carveout
for preliminary relief. We found that 24% of the California firms’ arbitration
clauses, compared with only 10% of the non-California firms’ provisions,
reserved a right to seek preliminary relief in court, a difference that is
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
These results suggest that California firms are responding to the
California court precedents. The fact that California firms are just as likely to
incorporate any carveouts, yet much less likely to incorporate a provision
carving out any specific claim, suggests that the parties are cognizant of the
California courts’ concern that multiple carveouts of firm claims creates
unconscionable non-mutuality. It appears that California firms are forced to
carve out fewer claims than they might otherwise carve out in order to
preserve enforcement of the arbitration clause, a clause that California firms
are more likely to seek in the first place.
The fact that California firms are much more likely to carve out a right
to seek preliminary relief in court also suggests that they are responding to
the California courts because, as mentioned earlier, the courts have made
clear that simple preliminary relief carveouts do not jeopardize arbitration
clause enforcement.200 Although the preliminary relief carveouts enable
California firms to freeze assets and stop infringing behavior so that
arbitrators can resolve the parties’ dispute, separation of the dispute in this
manner deprives the California courts of possible efficiency gains due to the
courts having jurisdiction over the entire matter.201
E. THE CALIFORNIA EFFECT: IT FIRMS VERSUS NON-IT FIRMS
Given the surprising differences between IT firms and non-IT firms,
and the differences between California and non-California firms, we
investigated the possibility that there were interactive effects at work. To get
a better sense of this possibility, in Table 7, we broke out the California firm
contracts to compare IT-firm and non-IT-firm contracts. We found that 57%
of California IT firms used carveouts, as compared with 31% of non-IT
firms, a difference that is statistically significant at the 5% level. The
difference initially seemed to indicate that although California firms avoid
using carveouts, IT firms primarily located in California seem relatively more

200. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
201. Gary Born counsels against the carving out of claims on the ground that it invites
bifurcated dispute resolution and therefore parallel proceedings. BORN, supra note 10, at 1127–
28. Note that carving out a right to proceed to court for preliminary relief but not resolution of
the claims guarantees bifurcated dispute resolution. Parties outside of California may be carving
out these claims for court resolution to minimize bifurcated proceedings notwithstanding the
potential risks that Born identifies.
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independent variables as in Table 8, and their definitions are given at the
top of the table.
The results show a consistent, significant positive time trend for all six
models. Carveouts are becoming increasingly common in our contracts, and
more carveouts are appearing in each contract. In Models 3, 4, 5, and 6, we
find a strong, statistically significant, and negative relationship between firms
primarily located in California and the number of carveouts contained in
their contracts. California firms clearly use fewer carveouts than firms
located outside of California.
Model 2, which examines the presence of any carveout, offers some
intriguing results as well. There is a weakly significant, negative effect on the
presence of carveouts for California based firms, but this is offset for IT firms
located in the state. California IT firms are significantly more likely than
California non-IT firms to have at least one court carveout in their CEO’s
employment contract. This is consistent with the univariate results shown in
Table 7. Models 3 and 4 were included to determine whether California IT
firms were more likely to include a larger number of carveouts from
arbitration. The results indicate that the California IT firms are as reluctant
to include multiple carveouts as are the California non-IT firms. Models 5
and 6 were included to determine whether California IT firms were more or
less likely to use preliminary relief carveouts, which are upheld by California
courts, rather than claim carveouts, which are more heavily scrutinized by
those courts. We see no change in the main results reported above,
indicating no significant differences across the different types of California
firms.

178

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:133

advantages of arbitration and litigation to be about equal. Far more
franchise contracts provide carveouts from arbitration than do the CEO
employment contracts, however. Only about half of the CEO employment
contracts with arbitration clauses contain carveouts, but virtually all of the
franchise agreements contain them.206 Why are there fewer carveouts in the
CEO employment contracts? One explanation is that a higher fraction of
franchise contracts are not negotiated; thus, the franchise contracts could
more closely represent the preferences of the franchisor, which are muted
in the CEO contracts by the ability of CEOs to have their preferences
observed. This possibility is strengthened by the fact that the franchise
contracts studied are the company’s standard-form contract, so even if
individual franchisees can bargain to change the agreement, those changes
would not appear in the empirical results. Another explanation, explored
below, is that legal restrictions force the parties in the CEO employment
contract negotiations to incorporate fewer carveouts in their agreements
than appear in franchise contracts. And finally, because guidelines for
standard-form contracts are publicly available,207 franchise contracts might
have achieved a greater degree of industry standardization than have CEO
employment contracts. Obviously, more study of these carveouts is needed.
Other questions beg for the further study of carveouts from arbitration.
Are carveouts equally present in other types of arbitration clauses? There is
evidence that consumer contracts often carve out consumers’ small
claims,208 probably because the major arbitration associations209 (and some
courts)210 require that consumers be granted these protections.
Is the frequency of the use of carveouts positively or negatively
correlated with the use of arbitration clauses in the first place? Put
differently, do carveouts make parties more comfortable with arbitration,
increasing the use of arbitration clauses, or do carveouts signal problems
with arbitration such that a high incidence of carveouts may serve as a proxy
for a relatively low demand for arbitration? As an initial matter, in the
regression, the presence of an arbitration clause in a prior contract did not
significantly affect the likelihood of the presence of a carveout, suggesting
that parties long comfortable with arbitration seemed to use carveouts just as
often (or as rarely) as other parties. We can glean relatively little from this
observation, however. Some carveouts might be positively correlated and
some negatively correlated with the use of arbitration clauses. For example,
it is likely that some carveouts aid or facilitate arbitration, and we would
expect those to be positively correlated with the use of arbitration clauses.
206. Id. at 739–40.
207. See, e.g., 2008 Franchise Registration and Disclosure Guidelines, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N,
INC., http://mn.gov/commerce/images/NASAA_guidelines.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2012).
208. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 60, at 5, 15.
209. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 61.
210. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 60, at 2.
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Preliminary relief carveouts might serve this function. Others, especially
carveouts for the resolution of claims rather than remedies, might signal
general disadvantages to arbitration. Here, a negative correlation is more
likely. A comparison of California and non-California firm contracts,
presented below, shows this basic pattern, but again, much more study is
needed.
Are carveouts equally common for contracting parties outside the
U.S.?211 Are they perhaps less common in cross-border contracts, where
concerns about a neutral litigation forum might arise?212 Are different types
of carveouts present in contracts drafted by parties outside of the U.S.? To
the extent that carveouts reflect the relative advantages of courts and
arbitration, a country with a weaker or stronger judiciary and/or weaker or
stronger arbitral forums might generate very different carveout behaviors.213
Despite a large number of unanswered questions, the carveouts studied
in the CEO employment contracts are instructive and can be used to reach
tentative conclusions. For one, the carveouts present in these contracts, as
well as in the franchise contracts, seem primarily focused on using courts to
protect the value of the firm’s information, reputation, and innovation.
These carveouts suggest that although arbitration may provide a costeffective and otherwise efficient mechanism for parties to enforce standard
contractual rights and for recovering standard legal remedies, courts are
needed to provide property-type protections, including the provision of
equitable relief. Property-type protections can provide relief swiftly,214 they
can help prevent future violations,215 and they can help parties protect
against loss to third parties.216 These features are especially important in
cases where money damages are likely hard to prove and are, therefore,
often unrecoverable.217
Of course these insights could be sharpened with further study. For
example, when parties carve out disputes for courts, which courts do they

211. One of us is in the process of studying carveouts in technology firm business contracts.
For example, in contracts involving two Chinese firms, no carveouts were found. O’Connor,
supra note 22.
212. See id. (finding that carveouts are also popular for cross-border contracts, but the
sample is small, and almost all contracts include one U.S. contracting party).
213. Id. (comparing contracts between U.S. companies with contracts between Chinese
companies).
214. Cf. Alisha Kay Taylor, What Does Forum Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas Mean for
Patent Reform?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 570, 577 (2007) (noting that in intellectualproperty litigation, quick injunctive relief is sought “because time is of the essence”).
215. This was a business justification offered in Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d
671, 677–78 (Ct. App. 2002).
216. Cf. Eileen M. Kane, Patent-Mediated Standards in Genetic Testing, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 835,
864 (2008) (discussing use of injunctions to prevent third-party violations of patent rights as a
property protection).
217. See Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677–78.
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choose? Are the parties seeking the advantages of particular courts, or do
they wish to preserve the right to obtain relief in any court where the
contract rights are likely to be violated (rights to information, reputation,
and innovations are intangibles)? To the extent that parties contract for
particular courts at least some of the time, those choices can provide lessons
to other courts about how to better protect and promote these interests.
Future studies should also identify any links between the use of carveouts
and the parties’ choice of arbitral forum. Some arbitral forums may better
provide quick relief to the parties prior to the start of formal arbitral
proceedings, or they might provide for expedited arbitration in certain
circumstances.218 Do contracts choosing these arbitral forums contain fewer
carveouts? If so, the results could provide guidance to other arbitration
associations regarding their services.
B. CARVEOUTS AND UNCONSCIONABILITY
The arbitration clauses in CEO employment contracts have important
policy implications for the regulation of employment arbitration clauses
more generally. For most employment contracts, the employer unilaterally
drafts the agreement with the vast majority of terms offered to the employee
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Recently, attention has focused on arbitration
clauses in employment contracts. Although arbitration can provide cheap
and quick dispute resolution that carries the promise of preserving the
employment relationship, it can also be used to disadvantage employees in
unfair ways. First, in some cases the costs of arbitration are so high that, if
forced to pay them, the employee can be effectively prevented from
vindicating some or all of her claims.219 Cost concerns have been addressed
by employers, who have in many cases agreed to pay some or all of the
arbitration costs,220 and by arbitration associations, which now offer low-cost
arbitration of employment disputes.221

218. See, e.g., IP LAW 360, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR COPYRIGHT AND
TRADEMARK MATTERS 4 (2006), available at http://www.foreclosuremediationfl.adr.org/si.asp?
id=4328; Peter J.W. Sherwin & Douglas C. Rennie, Interim Relief Under International Arbitration
Rules and Guidelines: A Comparative Analysis, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 317, 322–29 (2009).
219. See generally Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to
Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA
L. REV. 143 (2002) (surveying federal court cases addressing concerns regarding the
employee’s arbitration costs).
220. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence,
41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 823–25 (2008) (discussing studies demonstrating an employer’s
willingness to pay for an employee’s arbitration costs).
221. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES 40–42 (2010), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/
UCM/ADRSTG_004362&revision=latestreleased (documenting the costs of an arbitration “For
Disputes Arising Out of Employer-Promulgated Plans”).
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Second, arbitration agreements can have the effect of circumventing
procedural and other statutory safeguards provided to employees.222 Here
too some of the arbitration associations have provided for the protection of
employees with Due Process Protocols,223 and a review of the case law
indicates that employers have responded to judicial and private pressures by
incorporating fairer provisions into their arbitration clauses. The difficulties,
however, have not been fully resolved, due in part to weaker discovery rules,
fee-shifting provisions, and other procedural devices put in place to provide
cheaper employment arbitration.224
Third, even with ostensibly fair cost and procedural provisions, some
express concern that arbitration is inevitably biased toward the employer.
Specifically, the concern is that some arbitrators feel beholden to the
employer, as a repeat player and the party responsible for the arbitration
bill; and moreover, the employer, knowing more about how arbitrators are
likely to resolve disputes, is able to make a self-interested choice.225 In
response to this concern, at least one California court has determined that it
is suspect for a large employer to designate an arbitral forum and district
with a small number of available arbitrators.226 Note that the larger firms’
contracts in our sample were more likely to choose the larger AAA dispute
resolution. Perhaps this is a result of active bargaining on the part of the
CEOs.
As mentioned earlier, members of Congress have responded to these
and other concerns by introducing a bill entitled the Arbitration Fairness
Act that would prohibit the enforcement of predispute mandatory binding
arbitration clauses in employment and consumer contracts.227 In an earlier
article we argued that the CEO contracts provided evidence that a blanket
prohibition on the enforcement of employment arbitration clauses would be
overly broad.228 After all, the CEO contracts were jointly negotiated by
sophisticated parties who were often represented by attorneys, and half of
these contracts called for employment arbitration typically specifying the
same arbitration forums and rules that are chosen for other employment
contracts. The CEO contracts provide a glimpse of what employment
contracts would look like if employees had roughly equal bargaining power
222. See Martin H. Malin, Ethical Concerns in Drafting Employment Arbitration Agreements After
Circuit City and Green Tree, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 779, 786 (2003) (discussing such possibility).
223. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 61 (including the Due Process Protocol).
224. See, e.g., Trivedi v. Curexo Tech. Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding
unacceptable a provision entitling the prevailing party to recover attorney fees because it has
the effect of circumventing state antidiscrimination law protections for employees); Fitz v. NCR
Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (Ct. App. 2004) (striking arbitration clause for multiple problems,
including curtailment of an employee’s discovery rights).
225. See supra note 114–16 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 128.
227. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
228. See Thomas, O’Hara & Martin, supra note 50, at 999–1000.
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with their employers, and they therefore indicate that arbitration likely is
often in the interests of employees. To be sure, the unilaterally imposed
contracts should be scrutinized to ensure that individual arbitration
provisions are fair to employees, but a blanket prohibition on the
enforcement of arbitration clauses seemed unwarranted.
Our analysis also indicates that the California court condemnation of
the types of carveouts that we observed is misplaced. Recall that the
California courts will strike the arbitration clause from an employment
contract when the employer has carved out some of its claims for court
resolution. Although California state law purports to permit these carveouts
if the employer proves that they serve a legitimate business justification, to
date it appears that no California appellate court has deemed an offered
justification to be sufficient. And yet, the justifications offered by
employers—a need for quick relief in order to effectively protect
information and intellectual property, a need to protect against future
violations, and a need to establish intellectual-property rights as against third
parties—do seem to be legitimate justifications for the carveouts. The CEO
contracts lend credence to these justifications, especially since these
carveouts seem to be valuable enough to firms to commonly appear in
heavily negotiated agreements. In fact, taken as a whole our CEO contract
analysis provides substantial evidence that the types of carveouts we observe
with some frequency should be considered per se justified by legitimate
business purposes. Court protection of overreaching by employers in the
context of employment arbitration provisions might well make sense, but
this particular form of paternalism is not necessary.229
Indeed, our study suggests that California court paternalism is more
than simply unnecessary; it has the effect of denying firms a tool they
apparently find valuable for protecting the value of the firm’s information,
reputation, and innovation. Specifically, as our study indicates, firms
primarily located in California are significantly less likely to carve out claims
for resolution by courts than are firms located elsewhere. Given that firms
located elsewhere seem to derive value from the carveouts, the California
doctrine has the effect of destroying economic value and should not be
adopted by other courts.

229. Note that California courts might well be trying to keep employees from having to
arbitrate whenever possible, but that this systemic hostility to arbitration is not permitted under
the FAA. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (striking down
California’s unconscionability rule that had the effect of nullifying class arbitration waivers).

